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plete, than those on which he has found it
necessary to remark. Future inquiries may
possibly pursue, with advantage, some par-
ticular topics on which he has felt a certain
degree of distrust.
It may not be irrelevant or improper to
observe, that the present work has been written
by a person whose situation in life has supplied
information on several of the topics under
discussion…1
As one now pursuing the “practical business”
of central banking, I can relate easily to Thornton’s
disclaimer. I would just add that I value the con-
versations on these subjects with my colleagues
at the St. Louis Fed, especially Robert H. Rasche,
but that I am responsible for the views expressed.
These views do not necessarily reflect official
positions of the Federal Reserve System.
Almost every aspect of human behavior is
conditioned by expectations. Indeed, a distin-
guishing feature of humans among all living things
is that humans, to an unmatched degree, calculate
behavior in light of possible future outcomes. I
cannot discuss the whole of human behavior in
one lecture, or in one lifetime. Even the topic of
expectations in a macroeconomics context is
overly broad; I will concentrate rather unsystem-
atically on aspects of this topic that are of special
interest to me because of my current responsibil-
ities. I will discuss issues from the perspective
of central banking problems, but much of what I
say applies to other areas of government policy.
I
t is a great honor for me to be here tonight
to present the Twenty-Second Henry
Thornton lecture. In preparing this lecture,
it has been fascinating to read parts of
Thornton’s great book, An Enquiry into the
Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great
Britain, published in 1802, and F.A. Hayek’s intro-
duction to the 1962 reprint of Paper Credit. I
recall reading Thornton years ago, but remember
little of it. Rereading him today, I certainly appre-
ciate Thornton’s insights to a far greater extent
than I did when I first read his book. I have also
found it instructive to read several previous
Thornton lectures. I’ll refer to these lectures and
to Thornton himself on several occasions this
evening.
It is standard practice for Federal Reserve
officials, with the exception of the Chairman, to
begin every public presentation with a disclaimer.
Thornton himself wrote a disclaimer in the intro-
duction of his book, and I will adopt his disclaimer
as my own for this lecture. Thornton wrote:
That [this work’s] leading doctrines are just,
the writer feels a confident persuasion. That
it may have imperfections, and some, perhaps,
which greater care on his part might have cor-
rected, he cannot doubt. But he trusts, that a
man who is much occupied on the practical
business of life, will be excused by the public,
if he should present to them a treatise less
elaborate, and, in many respects, more incom-
1 F.A. von Hayek (1962, p. 69): first published in 1939, this book contains Hayek’s introduction, Thornton’s An Enquiry into the Nature and
Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain, two of Thornton’s speeches in the House of Commons in 1811, and other materials.By “rational expectations” I mean that market
outcomes have characteristics as if economic
agents are acting on the basis of the correct model
of how the world works and that they use all
available information in deciding on their actions.
That information includes probable future mone-
tary policy actions and, more generally, how
monetary policy actions are likely to depend on
various possible states of the economy. Expecta-
tions may be nonrational in an infinity of ways.2
Almost every economist is familiar with the color-
ful language Keynes used to describe his view
on how security values were determined. In one
of his more succinct statements, Keynes (1936,
p. 154) said that, “A conventional valuation which
is established as the outcome of the mass psychol-
ogy of a large number of ignorant individuals is
liable to change violently as the result of a sudden
fluctuation of opinion due to factors which do
not really make much difference to the prospec-
tive yield.” Keynes and many others have viewed
expectations as being driven by emotion and
efforts to ride market trends without regard to
underlying values. Popular commentary on bond,
stock, commodity, and foreign exchange markets
often focuses on presumed patterns in the data,
such as resistance and support levels, that make
no theoretical sense and are completely unsup-
ported by careful empirical investigation.
In econometric models, economists have often
used adaptive expectations, which are simple,
and simple-minded, extrapolations of the past.
Adaptive expectations are the antithesis of the
emotional process Keynes emphasized. Adaptive
expectations, as averages of recent observations,
change relatively smoothly and continuously.
They are unaffected by news items per se; if news
moves the market, the adaptive expectation incor-
porates only a fraction of the unexpected price
adjustment into expected future prices.
I will take up four topics. The first is what
we can learn about expectations from banking
panics and, more generally, from sharp distur-
bances in financial markets. The second is central
bank credibility. The third is inflationary expec-
tations. The fourth is the extent to which the
market can predict central bank actions. I will
connect these topics to produce what I hope will
be a coherent account of certain expectations
issues from the perspective of a practicing central
banker.
I do not doubt that expectations are sometimes
nonrational. My main theme, however, is that
we central bankers should not be smug in assess-
ing our presumably superior understanding of
what expectations ought to prevail. We need to
reflect on our possible role in creating and sustain-
ing expectations that we regard as nonrational,
and on the possibilities for pursuing policies that
yield market outcomes closer to those reflecting
rational expectations.
WHAT DO PANICS TELL US
ABOUT EXPECTATIONS?
Sudden and unpredictable changes in market
sentiment create problems for all sorts of busi-
nesses. Hayek, in his introduction to Thornton’s
Paper Credit, quotes from a contemporary account
of an incident Thornton had to face in 1810.
[Thornton] was on his road with his family to
Scotland. It was a time of severe pressure upon
banksandtradinginterests…Thebankinwhich
Mr. Thornton was a partner felt the pressure,
and felt it severely, just after their most able
partner had left London for the North. Had
Mr. Thornton known what was impending, he
would not have absented himself. The news
reached him on his route to Scotland, and
caused him some embarrassment. To return
from a journey undertaken and generally
known, would have spread rumors which
might have brought on the very crisis that was
to be feared. This course, therefore, could not
be thought of. He decided to continue his jour-
ney, but he opened himself in confidence to
one valued friend, and stated his wish that
some thousands of pounds might be placed at
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2 I use the word “nonrational” rather than “irrational” because the latter sometimes carries connotations that I do not intend. Expectations
may depart from full rationality without being “crazy,” “silly,” “emotional,” or “stupid.”the disposal of his partners in the bank. No
sooner was the hint given than it was met by
ample support. Funds poured in from all
quarters—Wilberforce, with generous ardour,
hastening to lead the way; and the money
came in such a flood, that his bank saw itself
lifted above the sands on which it was settling,
and floated into deep waters with abundant
resources. (p. 27)
This incident is interesting because it focuses
on the problem of managing market expectations.
From a central-banking perspective, the issues
have been quite well understood since Walter
Bagehot published Lombard Street in 1873. A
central bank can resolve a banking panic by pro-
viding liquidity to solvent banks.
Let’s look at the nature of the expectations
issue when financial panic strikes. The place to
start is with this question: Are the rumors sparking
the crisis true? In the incident recounted above,
the rumor was untrue. The bank was solvent and
had access to ample sources of liquid funds; once
it marshaled the funds, the problem was solved.
In other cases, of course, rumors are true. In the
fall of 1998, for example, Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM) was severely overextended.
The firm was indeed in danger of being unable
to meet its obligations, and market participants
were right to question its solvency. Moreover,
the obligations outstanding were so large that
significant market disruption might have
occurred had the firm defaulted.
A central bank faces several issues in cases
like LTCM. Without action, market prices may
decline so much that a thinly capitalized firm
goes under. But intervention may have the unde-
sirable effect of propping up an institution that
failed to meet the market test. This is the problem
of moral hazard; other firms may bet on central
bank intervention in similar cases in the future
and thereby manage their affairs in a way that
increases the probability of a crisis. Bagehot’s
solution to the moral hazard problem was for the
central bank to lend at a penalty rate of interest.
Marshaling private lenders who accept the risk
works the same way.
What is the nature of expectations in a panic?
Is the distinction between rational and nonrational
expectations helpful here? I think we must look
at two issues: One is that solvency may not be
clear even to the best informed, most rationally
calculating observer; the other is that the problem
is sometimes just informed versus incompletely
informed expectations.
Academic battles over rational expectations
have often focused on rational expectations versus
expectations driven by emotion or a failure to
calculate sensibly. However, I think that panics
large and small are sometimes driven by the lack
of complete information, and in those cases the
policy issue is relatively simple.
Consider an incident during the banking crisis
in the state of Rhode Island in 1990-91. I was on
the faculty of Brown University and lived in
Providence, Rhode Island, at that time. A number
of state-chartered credit unions and savings banks
were insured by a private deposit insurance com-
pany. One of these credit unions, by the way, was
the Brown University Employees’ Credit Union.
As I recall the chronology of events, in November
1990 one of the savings banks discovered a large
embezzlement, which led to its failure. That fail-
ure nearly wiped out the assets of the deposit
insurance company, which in turn led to wide-
spread concern about the safety of deposits in
other insured institutions. The crisis was reported
in the Providence newspaper day after day. CNN
sent a reporter to cover the story, and the reporter
went on camera standing in front of a local bank—
the Old Stone Bank. The next day, following the
CNN report, there was a run on Old Stone Bank.
Old Stone was federally insured and had nothing
whatsoever to do with the crisis of the locally
insured credit unions and savings banks.
Was it rational for Old Stone’s depositors to
pull their funds out of the bank? Those of us
involved in banking and finance might easily say
that such behavior was irrational because that bank
was federally insured. But as I reflect on my own
behavior in areas where I am less well informed,
I am not so sure that judgment is sound. For
example, when the recent publicity concerning
Firestone tires hit the newspapers, I went out to
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my cars were equipped.
Information is costly, and our brains have
only a finite number of cells to hold information.
When an event or rumor brings an issue to public
attention, many people will inevitably and appro-
priately react on the basis of highly imperfect
information. The reactions may be perfectly sen-
sible—rational, if you will—given the limited
information at hand. Given incomplete informa-
tion, I think it is completely rational for depositors
to pull funds out of a suspect bank. Indeed, in
the Eighth Henry Thornton Lecture, Karl Brunner
argued that money itself exists because it helps
to alleviate information problems. I agree with
Brunner that the full-information version of the
rational expectations hypothesis provides valu-
able insights for certain problems but is incapable
of explaining some important phenomena.
Returning to the case in Rhode Island, the run
on Old Stone Bank was quickly halted through
the spread of accurate information. The bank
itself and banking authorities emphasized to the
public that Old Stone was federally insured and
had no connection to the statewide banking crisis.
Many panic cases in practice reflect highly
incomplete information. Given the costs of obtain-
ing information, I think situations of this kind,
which are not uncommon, provide compelling
evidence against a pure, full-information version
of the rational expectations hypothesis. Not only
are some market participants poorly informed,
which is obvious, but market outcomes can reflect
poorly informed views. However, it is essential
that we not equate expectations based on incom-
plete information with expectations that are hope-
lessly emotional and irrational; provision of
information does have observable effects on
market outcomes. From a policy perspective, that
means that provision of accurate information is
the first line of defense in cases of financial panics.
If this argument seems almost self-evident,
we need to remember that from time to time cen-
tral banks (and government authorities more
generally) have contributed to the problem rather
than alleviating it. Sometimes panics are driven
by rumors that turn out to be substantially accu-
rate. In such circumstances, those in authority
may attempt to alleviate or avoid panic by gloss-
ing over the severity of the problem. Doing so
may help to manage a particular incident, but at
the cost of damaging the long-run credibility of
the authorities.
A particularly clear, and expensive, example
of this process was the U.S. savings and loan (S&L)
industry. From the mid-1960s to the late 1980s,
the U.S. government and regulatory bodies took
numerous steps to deal with the institutional and
financial weaknesses of numerous S&Ls. The
process culminated in a $150 billion government
bailout of the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC). Congress closed down
FSLIC and the regulatory agency, the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board. The political careers of
several members of Congress were damaged or
ended by the voters. I am convinced that the gov-
ernment could have avoided this entire mess if it
had required market value accounting for S&Ls
from the beginning.
Providing information prospectively, as with
market value accounting, is perfectly feasible in
many cases. In the Rhode Island banking crisis,
and others, part of the problem has been that
depositors genuinely believed that their deposits
were perfectly safe—as safe as the currency in
their wallets. The Rhode Island incident was not
unique; the United States has a long history of
failure of private and state deposit insurance
funds.3 If a government can standardize the defi-
nition of Scotch whiskey, why can’t it standardize
the definition of “deposit”? Given that depositors
have so often been confused in the past, why not
reserve the word “deposit” in the United States
for a liability insured by the U.S. government?
Along the same lines, in the United States
we need to clarify the extent of the federal guar-
antee for the liabilities of governmentally spon-
sored enterprises (GSEs). Although the legal
situation differs from one enterprise to another,
the liabilities of GSEs often carry no explicit
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3 See English (1993).guarantee, yet the market prices these obligations
as if there were a federal guarantee. Based on past
practice and continuing debate, market partici-
pants have every reason to assign a relatively high
probability to a federal bailout should a GSE come
close to defaulting on its obligations. Similar
issues surround the “too big to fail” doctrine
applied to large private financial institutions.
If a market crisis emerged one day because
investors came to believe that the federal govern-
ment was prepared to let one or more of these
firms fail, would the crisis be the fault of nonra-
tional expectations or of government policy that
failed to clarify the issue?
The appropriate government role in guaran-
teeing financial obligations is a complex issue,
and I don’t intend to explore the merits of various
positions here. But I do feel strongly that the
government itself, not the market, is responsible
if market expectations over a potential default
seem emotionally driven and volatile. I hope I’m
wrong, but I’m willing to speculate that the issue
will remain unresolved in the United States until
a threatened or actual default forces the issue.
The United States did not address the S&L issue
until it became too large to ignore. The political
response is likely to depend heavily on the facts,
or perceived facts, at the time, especially claims
about who will be hurt by whatever decision is
made and who is “at fault” and therefore deserves
to be punished. Neither I nor market experts who
know more about these matters can form confi-
dent expectations about outcomes in such cases.
But I want to reiterate that the issues surround-
ing government guarantees can and should be
addressed before a crisis strikes.
The rational expectations revolution in macro-
economics made clear that the distinction between
policy and policy actions is critical. Policy reflects
the general regularity of behavior of policymakers
over time; policy actions are the individual
responses case by case. Whenever policymakers
believe that market expectations are irrational,
policymakers ought first to look into the mirror
and ask whether policy is coherent. Market expec-
tations about policy cannot be coherent if policy
is not coherent. I’ve suggested that U.S. policy
toward federal guarantees is currently ill defined,
and now I want to turn more explicitly to mone-
tary policy.
I must say that there is amazingly little aca-
demic research providing solid guidance as to
what I ought to do to help define a more coherent
monetary policy. I am not implying, of course,
that I believe that Fed policy is incoherent today.
What I am saying is that research showing how
we can do better, or even just characterizing more
accurately the policy followed in recent years, is
surprisingly thin. Research on monetary policy
reaction functions seems quite unfruitful to date.
Among those who have worked on this issue, I
think the view is nearly unanimous that in recent
years Federal Reserve policy has been better than
any proposed explicit policy rule. That means
that no one has been able to write down a policy
rule that accurately characterizes Fed policy.
This observation has a direct implication for
research into the rationality of expectations. The
key idea of the rational expectations hypothesis
is that the market forms expectations based on
estimates of model parameters that match the true
model parameters. No one should be surprised if
economists have difficulty confirming the ration-
ality of market expectations about inflation, for
example, if economists cannot even characterize
Fed policy with much accuracy. Why should
economists judge the market by standards they
themselves, with all their knowledge of theory
and econometrics, cannot meet? Indeed, this line
of argument opens up the possibilities (i) that
the market may behave as if it were able to char-
acterize policy correctly and (ii) that economists’
tests of rational expectations fail because econo-
mists fail rather than because markets fail. In the
last section of this lecture, I’ll describe some recent
research at the St. Louis Fed suggesting that mar-
kets in fact understand recent Fed policy far better
than economists do.
I’ve argued that market panics, and inexpli-
cable changes in asset prices more generally, may
not reflect the irrationality that many economists
seem to assume. Panics may arise, at least in part,
from the failure of policymakers to follow clear
and coherent policies. Everyone agrees that, in
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changes. If policy is ill defined, then no one should
be surprised when asset prices change as market
perceptions about prospective policy change.
These perceptions will be weakly held and are
therefore subject to change, perhaps even abrupt
change, because it is not rational to have firm
views about policy when policy is ill defined.
An objection to this view might be that it
provides no explanation of the timing of panics
and sharp changes in asset prices. But this objec-
tion is unconvincing. If an accurate empirical
model—whether an economic or a psychological
model—of timing existed, then the market would
use that information to seek the profit implied.
An uncontestable implication of rational expec-
tations theory and evidence is that there are no
easy profits to be had in asset markets. Panics and
market crises must be unpredictable. To me, as a
policymaker, the implication of inexplicable and
unpredictable panics and asset price changes is
not that we need a new, nonrational expectations
approach to understanding expectations. Instead,
we need to examine how policy bodies can more
effectively transmit accurate information to the
market and how policy can be made more coherent
and reliable. In short, policymakers need to real-
locate their thinking time more to looking inward
at what they do and less to looking outward at
what markets do.
WHERE DOES THIS CREDIBILITY
COME FROM?
This discussion leads naturally to the broader
subject of credibility. Markets should view eco-
nomic policy in terms of a rule or regularity of
behavior. Markets interpret individual policy
actions in the context of their consistency with
the policy, given the facts of the current situation.
If authorities mislead the public in a particular
situation, then public confusion or distrust will
make it more difficult for policymakers to deal
with the next crisis. It is important to emphasize
the enormous benefit of central bank credibility
in all areas in which it exercises its powers.
Central bankers have not always appreciated
the importance of credibility. To relate a personal
example from the 1970s, while on the faculty of
Brown University I had many contacts with
Federal Reserve officials. As inflation continued
over the course of the decade, I became increas-
ingly skeptical of the Federal Reserve’s profession
of allegiance to the goal of low inflation. I said, in
effect, to some of my Fed friends, “I don’t believe
you.” I think they were insulted by what I said,
but the markets increasingly did not believe the
Fed either. Although criticism from many differ-
ent directions is a fact of life for central bankers,
they should take such criticism seriously. At the
same time, they should be careful not to assume
that comments reflecting general esteem for those
in office necessarily are a vote of confidence in
the policies being pursued.
There is now an extensive literature on central
bank credibility; I can hardly claim to be familiar
with all of it. But what does strike me about this
literature, as useful as it is, is that it does not go
very far in providing specific advice to central
banks about building credibility. The practical
problem I face is in trying to decide how, if at all,
to react to the latest release of employment data,
inflation data, and the steady flow of other infor-
mation of all kinds day by day. The problem is to
make individual policy actions add up to a coher-
ent policy. To be credible, the central bank must
be successful in achieving its stated goals. To
deliver on these goals, the central bank must
know how to respond to the steady flow of infor-
mation, and its responses to this information must
make sense as policy. That is, every central bank
needs a monetary policy strategy in which the
goals are clear and the policy actions to achieve
the goals are well defined.
Many market participants have great expertise
in monetary matters, and they form reasoned
judgments about the performance of central banks.
We may call the view that emerges “reasoned
credibility.” But there is another aspect of credi-
bility that arises from the fact that most of any
individual’s views and expectations come not
from personal study and investigation but from
acceptance of views of trusted authorities, or
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everything. Reliance on experts is a consequence
of the costliness of information. If a central banker
is a trusted authority, his or her view on a wide
range of economic issues, including many far
removed from monetary policy, will carry great
weight. Because trusted experts differ, and we
all face the problem of picking which experts to
believe, over time a central bank can develop
special credibility among competing authorities.
We may call this general trust of a central bank
“institutional credibility.”
Credibility in both its dimensions is earned,
or lost, day in and day out, over big issues and
small, and is not compartmentalized. In other
words, a central bank cannot be distrusted in one
area of its operations and retain high credibility
in other areas.
The value of credibility is particularly clear
in a crisis. When information is highly incomplete
and the true state of affairs murky, it is extremely
valuable for society if the markets can look to the
central bank as a trusted authority and accept its
judgments and actions. If the central bank is
indeed well informed and competent, its credi-
bility in the markets will obviously make its task
far easier.
In 1985, Michael Parkin presented the Seventh
Henry Thornton Lecture. His title was, “Inflation
Expectations: From Adaptive to Rational to…?”
As a part of his insightful review of expectations
issues, Parkin discusses the failure of inflation
expectations to fall promptly with the change in
U.K. monetary policy in the early 1980s. He con-
cluded that, given the history and the incentives
to inflate, “it is not rational to expect, and act
upon the basis of, a low rate of inflation” (p. 13).
Both the United States and the United Kingdom
bore heavy costs to reestablish expectations of
low inflation and central bank credibility.
Central banks around the world today enjoy
high credibility compared with the situation
only 20 years ago. Just as there were observable
market consequences—deep recession—of
impaired credibility in the United States and
United Kingdom in the early 1980s, there are
observable market consequences today.
What are these observable consequences? I
will speak only to the situation in the United
States, where I know the history and data in detail.
I think that there are many such observable con-
sequences and that one of them is the sustained
favorable surprise in the unemployment rate.
Unemployment as low as the rate the United
States has enjoyed in recent years could not have
occurred without entrenched expectations of
continuing low inflation. In the conventional
Phillips curve, the rate of inflation depends on
expected inflation and the gap between the actual
and natural rates of unemployment. Anecdotal
reports from employers and systematic informa-
tion suggest that the U.S. labor market has been
stretched abnormally tight for several years now.
I think the best explanation of how these tight
labor market conditions can continue is that
expectations trump the gap. Firms are just not
willing to bid aggressively for labor to fill empty
positions because senior management does not
believe that higher wages can be passed on in
higher prices. Expectations of continuing low
inflation dominate the outcome.
That is my tentative hypothesis anyway, but
because I do not have research results to support
it at this time I’ll not pursue the matter further
except to offer one more observation. Most econ-
omists believe, I think, that the rational expec-
tations hypothesis is extremely valuable in
understanding outcomes in auction markets—
like those for equities, bonds, foreign exchange,
and commodities—but is of limited application
in the labor market. The labor market, so the argu-
ment goes, is dominated by institutional behavior,
attitudes concerning equity, and slow adjustment
to changing conditions. In econometric models
of the labor market, adaptive expectations seem
to work well enough. What I’m suggesting is that
the U.S. unemployment rate has departed from
the conventional estimate of the Phillips curve
because that estimate failed to account adequately
for the role of rational inflationary expectations
in the labor market. The theory of rational expec-
tations provides guidance in understanding eco-
nomic behavior in all parts of the economy, not
just in auction markets.
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INFLATION EXPECTATIONS?
Thornton had a clear understanding of the
distinction between the nominal and real rate of
interest. In a speech before the House of Commons
in 1811, he noted the following: “If, for example,
a man borrowed of the bank a thousand pounds
in 1800, and paid it back in 1810, having detained
it by means of successive loans through that
period, he paid back that which had become
worth less by 20 or 30 percent than it was worth
when he first received it. He would have paid an
interest of 50 pounds per annum for the use of
this money; but if from this interest were deducted
the 20 pounds or 30 pounds per annum, which
he had gained by the fall in the value of the money,
he would find that he had borrowed at 2 or 3
percent, and not at 5 percent as he appeared to
do” (Hayek, pp. 335-36).
A thorough understanding of the distinction
between real and nominal interest rates is a great
advance in central banking practice over the last
35 years. We’ve finally caught up with Thornton.
In the United States, at least, in the mid-to-late
1960s, the practical importance of the distinction
between real and nominal interest rates was not
appreciated. Rising interest rates in the late 1960s
were misinterpreted as evidence of a more restric-
tive monetary policy, when, in fact, nominal rates
were not even keeping up with the increase in
inflation expectations.
Compared with 35 years ago, the Federal
Reserve today has access to far more data on
expectations. With inflation-indexed bonds out-
standing, we have day-by-day evidence on the
behavior of the spread between conventional and
indexed bonds. Survey information is widely
available. I watch these data closely because they
provide clear evidence of the central bank’s suc-
cess in maintaining credibility in achieving sus-
tained low inflation.
The logic of the credibility argument, however,
suggests that inflation expectations data do not
provide definitive evidence about whether mon-
etary policy itself is on track. Given that the Fed
enjoys very high credibility today, the markets
will not necessarily bid up inflation expectations
when and if policy goes astray. High credibility
means that the market trusts the Federal Reserve’s
policy judgments. That being the case, the Federal
Reserve cannot reliably extract information from
data on expectations about the appropriateness
of current policy actions.
It is logically possible that policy actions are
inconsistent with sustained low inflation at the
same time that the market simply trusts the Fed
and does not perform a separate analysis of policy
actions. Why should any of us, on any matter,
engage in a costly investigation when we can
instead simply accept the judgment of a trusted
authority? The answer is obvious: If the author-
ity is completely trusted, and if separate confir-
mation of the information is costly, then the
cost-efficient thing to do is simply to accept the
authority’s judgment.
Let me summarize this analysis. The expected
rate of inflation over a five-year, or longer, horizon
is a direct measure of central bank credibility
regarding inflation. At any given time, monetary
policy—policy, not policy actions—may or may
not be consistent with long-term inflation expec-
tations. Eventually, of course, expectations and
policy must be consistent because one or the
other will adjust.
Failure to understand this point could foster
policy mistakes. When credibility is high, as it is
in the United States today, inflation expectations
will be slow to adjust. Actual inflation, influenced
by expected inflation, may also be slow to adjust.
Therefore, expected inflation, certainly, and actual
inflation, probably, are poor guides as to the
appropriateness of monetary policy in the short
run. Similarly, when inflation expectations are
high and credibility low, the central bank has the
twin problems of getting policy turned around to
be consistent with lower long-run inflation and
of adjusting policy as credibility builds over time.
If the Fed cannot rely on actual and expected
inflation to judge the appropriateness of current
policy, because these measures are dominated by
the market’s assessment of Fed credibility, what
can it rely on? We need to concentrate on the
underlying determinants of inflation and early
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in financial markets, the supply-demand balance
across industries in general, and the behavior of
specific prices likely to lead overall inflation are
relevant. The aim of policy should be to act before
changes in inflation appear; clearly, once these
changes do appear, the task of restoring credibility
and reversing all the adjustments that firms and
households have started to make becomes more
difficult.
WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
MARKET PREDICTIONS OF
CENTRAL BANK POLICY?
I’m now going to bring the various strands of
my discussion together. My colleague Robert
Rasche and I have been pursuing a line of research
on the predictability of monetary policy actions.
The paper (Poole and Rasche, 2000) is available
in the working papers section of the St. Louis Fed
Web site; it will be published in the Journal of
Financial Services Research. I’ll outline the basic
idea in that paper and then connect it to the
argument of this lecture.
Consider a state of monetary policy nirvana
in the world we actually live in. That is, if the
central bank did as good a job as you can imagine
in today’s world—a world with many gaps in
knowledge, data inaccuracies, and all the real
problems real central banks face—what would
we observe?
Let’s suppose that you think a measured CPI
inflation rate of 1 percent per year is optimal and
that you believe the central bank can offset some
financial and real disturbances to cushion fluctu-
ations in output and employment without com-
promising the inflation objective. This is a short
description of what I believe, but you can substi-
tute your own specification for mine.
The market will, in due time, learn of the
policy objective and the policy actions designed
to achieve that objective. Real central banks almost
without exception implement policy by setting a
target for a short-term interest rate, usually an
overnight bank rate. In the United States, that
target rate is the federal funds rate. So, I’ll assume
that our real central bank implements policy
actions that way.
I’ve given you a very simple description of
what the central bank wants to do and its proce-
dure for pursuing its objective. Given the assumed
nirvana state of monetary policy, the central bank
does its job efficiently. By that I mean that it
responds sensibly to all the ambiguities and prob-
lems real central banks face. As new information
arrives, the central bank efficiently processes its
significance and adjusts its target for the overnight
rate as required to achieve its policy goals. Given
the inherent gaps in knowledge and data, some-
times the central bank will act too quickly or too
slowly, by too much or too little. But my presump-
tion is that the central bank can avoid cumulative
errors and recover from policy missteps without
missing its objectives.
Participants in financial markets will under-
stand what the central bank is doing. To under-
stand market outcomes in this setting, one other
observation is needed. In the United States—I’m
not sure about the situation elsewhere—the central
bank has no significant informational advantage
over the market. The Fed and the markets receive
government statistical data at essentially the same
time. The Fed does have an advantage over the
market in that it has a very large staff and does
obtain anecdotal information not generally avail-
able. However, individual firms have much more
extensive information about their own markets
than the Fed does. I think it is approximately
correct, and certainly appropriate at the level of
theoretical modeling, to assume that the markets
and the Fed receive the same information at the
same time.
Market participants have ample incentive to
form accurate expectations about central bank
policy actions. How accurate are those expecta-
tions likely to be? Given my assumptions, the
market ought to be very accurate in predicting
policy actions. The market and the central bank
get the same data at the same time; the market
understands the policy objectives and the policy
actions appropriate to achieve the objectives. As
new data arrive, the market should interpret the
Expectations
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most of the time, and reach the same conclusion
about the significance of the data.
Rasche and I have explored this hypothesis
for the United States. Our research is ongoing,
but at this time we can report that as of the last
few years the market has been quite accurate in
forecasting Fed policy actions. Since 1988, when
trading opened in the federal funds futures mar-
ket, we have had a very direct reading on market
expectations about Fed policy. Since 1994, that
market has predicted policy actions quite accu-
rately on the whole.
It is instructive to note that 1994 was a water-
shed year. In February 1994, the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC)—the Fed’s main
monetary policy body—first began to release a
policy decision about its federal funds rate target
immediately following the FOMC meeting. Before
that time, the market learned of policy actions
by observing open market operations conducted
by the Open Market Desk at the New York Fed.
Moreover, before 1994, policy actions occurred
more often between regularly scheduled FOMC
meetings than at the meetings. Since February
1994, almost all policy actions have been taken
at regular FOMC meetings.
Although the FOMC adjusts the target federal
funds rate most often by only 25 basis points, it
sometimes has made larger adjustments. But these
adjustments have been well predicted by the
market.
This evidence shows conclusively that it is
possible for a central bank to pursue a highly pre-
dictable policy, in the sense that, given the avail-
able information at the time of a policy meeting,
the market can predict the policy action. Policy
actions cannot be predicted far in advance because
the information driving policy decisions cannot
be predicted far in advance. But, as information
accumulates before a policy meeting, the market
and the central bank can converge on a common
interpretation of the information.
Moreover, the market is well ahead of econo-
mists in understanding this process. I know of no
econometric models that predict both the timing
and the magnitude of Fed policy moves with
anything close to the accuracy of the predictions
in the federal funds futures market. There is an
important research agenda implied by this obser-
vation. We need a deeper understanding of U.S.
monetary policy to increase the probability of
extending recent policy successes into the indef-
inite future.
This experience also shows that the central
bank can change what it does to promote more
accurate market expectations. By disclosing policy
decisions quickly and by confining policy actions
to regularly scheduled meetings, the FOMC has
made possible improved market forecasts of
monetary policy actions. The change in practice
in February 1994 illustrates the point I emphasized
earlier—that the central bank can improve the
accuracy of information available to the market.
I believe that the simple step of prompt dis-
closure in February 1994 also imposed a valuable
discipline on the FOMC itself. By confining most
policy actions to days of FOMC meetings, the
Committee made its own behavior more predict-
able. Now, everyone knows that a policy action
at another time is special. The FOMC must think
carefully about whether it wants to send a special
message by changing policy between meetings
and, if it does, what the message is. What the
central bank does will shape expectations; for
the central bank to be able to predict its effects
on expectations, its own behavior must be as
regular as possible.
WHAT SHOULD THE AGENDA
FOR CENTRAL BANKS BE?
The rational expectations revolution in
macroeconomics changed forever how we think
about economic policy. We know that under-
standing markets requires that we understand
market expectations about monetary policy. We
know that the distinction between policy actions
and policy itself is of central importance. We
know that expectations are not always fully
rational, but I have been at pains to argue that
some of the problems caused by nonrational
expectations are correctable.
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the economy works better when markets are kept
guessing about monetary policy. The presumption
must be that market participants make more effi-
cient decisions—decisions that maximize eco-
nomic growth by minimizing the wastage of
resources from expectational errors—when mar-
kets can correctly predict central bank actions.
That does not require that central bankers and
market participants be able to forecast the unfore-
castable, but that they have a common understand-
ing of the strategy governing policy actions.
I’ve suggested a large agenda—one that is
indefinitely large—for central banks and govern-
ments. We need to focus on areas where market
expectations are hazy because government policy
itself is or may be ill defined. These include the
nature of government guarantees, monetary policy
objectives, and the strategy to reach those objec-
tives. Some of the things we need to examine may
appear terribly mundane. For example, I think
that the FOMC probably meets more often than
necessary. Market interest rates have ample room
to fluctuate for any given federal funds rate, and
it is rare that anything happens within the usual
six weeks between FOMC meetings to require a
reassessment of policy. If the markets and the
central bank really do have a common under-
standing of monetary policy, it is hard for me to
believe that outcomes for the 10-year bond rate,
say, will depend on whether the policy meetings
occur once a month or once a quarter. However,
each meeting is an object of speculation; the
market would be better served if traders would
concentrate on the fundamentals behind policy
decisions than on the meeting itself. My point is
not actually to take a firm position on the minor
issue of the meeting schedule but instead to point
out that all sorts of things should be discussed as
possible ways to improve the market’s understand-
ing of monetary policy.
I finish with a plea to both academics and
central bankers. Of academics, I ask that research
address this question: How, very explicitly, should
policy instruments be adjusted? That is, what
should central banks do and when should they
do it? Of my central bank colleagues, I ask that
we spend more time focused on defining general
policy rules, or regularities, within which we will
fit individual policy actions. Both enterprises
promise significant improvements in the accu-
racy of market expectations and the stability of
markets.
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